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AACSC
333 W. BROADWAY ST.
SUITE 101
LONG BEACH, CA 90802
562.426.8341

 

Sacramento Report
by Peter Conlin, Exq.
with the lobbying firm of Norwood and Mattoch, representing AACSC this year in Sacramento

As this Sacramento Report goes to press, the California Legislature is in the midst of its most active legislative period. Marathon committee hearings conducted during the last two weeks of June – scheduled to meet the so-called “policy committee” deadline of July 8th by which date all legislation must pass out of the relevant policy committee -- will shape the agenda for the remainder of this legislation term.

At the same time, budget negotiations between Governor Schwarzenegger and the Democratic leadership have begun in earnest as the July 1st constitutional deadline for the budget draws near. Next month’s report will describe the outcomes of this legislative effort, with particular attention paid to bill proposals affecting apartment owners. This issue offers an opportunity for an early assessment of the November special election that the Governor recently called.

Governor Schwarzenegger first suggested that he might call a special election during his “State of the State” address last January. In that speech, Schwarzenegger spoke of a breakdown in the legislative process that, to his mind, made true policy reform impossible. The Governor attributed this breakdown to an ascendancy of special interest power in Sacramento. Schwarzenegger argued that the legislature failed to grapple with urgent policy problems and embrace needed reforms because of its over-reliance on special interest dollars.

As a solution the Governor proposed what he termed his “four reforms” to break the hold on special interests in Sacramento and clear the political path for comprehensive policy reform. The four reforms would (1) change the reapportionment process, (2) impose spending restraints on the state budget, (3) impose limits on state pension contributions, and (4) alter current formulas for education funding.
In his speech, the Governor invited the Legislature to work with him on these issues but cautioned that if the Legislature failed to act to his satisfaction he would go over the heads of the legislators and present his proposals directly to the voters through the initiative process.

Six months and much political fighting later the Governor called a special election for this November so that the voters could consider his proposals. The reforms have been scaled back somewhat, both in quantity and scope.

After legislative hearings revealed a flaw in the Schwarzenegger proposal to move the state pension system from a “defined benefit” to a “defined contribution” model – arguably the language would have denied death benefits to the surviving spouse of a slain peace officer – the Governor withdrew this plank of his program.

The education reforms Schwarzenegger proposed also showed decreasing ambition; what started as a move to reform the structure of education spending has reduced to a plan simply to increase the number of years of service required – from 2 to 5 – before a teacher achieves tenure.

The redistricting and spending reforms retain their initial bold character. The Governor proposes taking the once-a-decade chore of redrawing legislative districts out of the hands of the legislature and assigning a panel of retired judges to the task. The Governor also proposes a “live-within-your-means” spending limitation that would restrict increases in state spending to increases in state revenue. These two measures along with the teacher tenure proposal have qualified for the November 2005 ballot.

The special election ballot will contain more than the three Schwarzenegger initiatives, however. Several other measures, qualified by political groups not necessarily affiliated with Schwarzenegger and some downright hostile to him, will also come before the voters in November. (Whenever the Governor calls a special election, for whatever purpose, any initiatives that have otherwise qualified for the next scheduled statewide election automatically get swept into the special election.)
Among these will be an initiative to require parental notification before a minor can have an abortion, a proposal to cap pharmaceutical prices, and a so-called “paycheck protection” proposal that would require public-employee unions to obtain the annual, written consent of a member to use any portion of his/her dues for political action.

The Legislature could also place any number of legislative initiatives on the special-election ballot up to and until mid-August. Whatever its final form, the special election ballot will be broad, complicated, and beyond the control of any one political actor.

Predicting the contours of the special-election campaign, let alone the outcome, is risky business. In fact, the Governor could decide to effectively pull the plug on the entire exercise by cutting a deal with the legislature on his reforms.

While the special election will go on in any event, advocates of a deal believe that were the Governor and the Democratic leadership to strike compromises on redistricting, state spending and education, the sides could defuse the special election politics.

Under this theory, the compromises reached that would require voter approval would be added to the special-election ballot through legislative initiatives. Both the Governor and Democrats would agree to mount joint campaigns in favor of these compromises while urging voters to reject all the other initiatives. This plan assumes that political leaders of both parties can control campaign activity and thereby control voters.

Assume for purposes of discussion that no deal is struck and the special election proceeds as a contested campaign. A long-held election axiom is that turnout for special elections falls significantly below the numbers for regular and regularly-scheduled elections. It is also thought that the mix of special election voters skews more conservative than what is seen in a normal election.

If these patterns were to emerge this November, Schwarzenegger would gain an advantage. But caution should be taken in projecting past patterns into this campaign. While special elections sometimes proceed from dramatic origins – recall the Gray Davis recall—more often a special election is called on account of a vacancy in office. Low turnout under these circumstances most likely reflects low voter interest.

The Schwarzenegger special likely will attract the attention of voters. The Governor, who will most likely seek reelection in 2006, will need to fight aggressively for his proposals – his prestige is on the line. His Democrat opponents, not wanting to give the Governor a big victory leading into the 2006 election cycle, will engage him with significant resources.

Already the various public-employee unions, looking both to defeat the paycheck protection proposal and to deal Schwarzenegger a political defeat, have pledged to raise over $70 million for the special. Those stakes suggest a high-profile and highly contentions race. This won’t be a sleepy little special election.

Just as past special elections shouldn’t be seen as a prologue for this year’s race, the Governor’s recent slide in popularity polls shouldn’t be seen as a clear indication of how the election will turn out. One political maxim that continues to provide useful guidance is the saying “you can’t beat something with nothing.” The Governor’s popularity has withered under months of uninterrupted political attacks. Up until now he has offered little in response. But if and when the special-election campaign heats up, the debate changes from simple attacks on Schwarzenegger to an evaluation of his proposals.

The same polls that show Schwarzenegger’s approval ratings sliding also show that voters, when asked generic issues questions without any accompanying information on where the politicians and political parties line up, tend to support most of the Schwarzenegger agenda.

The Governor remains a unique political figure with an unmatched ability to communicate effectively with voters. Although the initial polls indicate trouble ahead at the ballot for his reform proposals, it would be a mistake to count him out.

 

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